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Abstract
Classical mechanics and standard Copenhagen quantum mechanics respect subspace
implications. For example, if a particle is confined in a particular region R of space, then in
these theories we can deduce that it is confined in regions containing R. However, subspace
implications are generally violated by versions of quantum theory that assign probabilities
to histories, such as the consistent histories approach.
I define here a new criterion, ordered consistency, which refines the criterion of consis-
tency and has the property that inferences made by ordered consistent sets do not violate
subspace relations. This raises the question: do the operators defining our observations
form an ordered consistent history? If so, ordered consistency defines a version of quantum
theory with greater predictive power than the consistent histories formalism. If not, and
our observations are defined by a non-ordered consistent quantum history, then subspace
implications are not generally valid.
PACS: 03.65.Bz
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1. Introduction
We take it for granted that we can infer quantitatively less precise statements from
our observations. For example, if we know that an atom is confined in some region R
of space, we believe we are free to assume for calculational purposes only that it lies in
some larger region containing R. Our understanding of the world and our interpretation of
everyday experience tacitly rely on subspace implications of this general type: if a physical
quantity is known to lie within a range R1, then it lies in all ranges R2 ⊃ R1.
In classical mechanics, subspace inferences follow from the correspondence between
physical states and points in phase space: if the state of a system lies in a subset S1 of
phase space, it lies in all subsets S2 ⊃ S1. Similarly, in Copenhagen quantum theory, they
hold since if the state of a quantum system lies in a subspace H1 of Hilbert space, it lies
in all subspaces H2 ⊃ H1.
However, neither classical mechanics nor (presumably) Copenhagen quantum theory
is fundamentally correct. If the basic principles of quantum theory apply to the universe
as a whole, then a post-Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory seems to be needed,
and any justification of the subspace implications must ultimately be given in terms of that
interpretation. Though it may seem hard to imagine how to make sense of nature without
allowing subspace inferences, there are versions of quantum theory in which they do not
hold. In particular, this is true of recent attempts to develop history-based formulations
of quantum theory,[1,2,3,4,5] which rely on the notion of consistent or decoherent sets of
histories.
This paper suggests a way in which quantum theory can plausibly be interpreted
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via statements about histories, without violating subspace implications — the motivation
being that both history-based interpretations and subspace implications seem natural.
The interpretation which results, a refinement of the consistent histories approach based
on ordered consistent sets of histories, is certainly not the ultimate answer to the problems
of quantum theory. It does not solve the measurement problem, for example. But perhaps
it is a step in the right direction, or at least in an interesting direction. It also helps to
make precise the question as to what it would mean if subspace implications actually were
violated in nature, which the last part of the paper examines.
The language of quantum histories may not necessarily be the right way to interpret
the quantum theory of closed systems. Bohm theory[6] and dynamical collapse theories[7]
are particularly interesting alternatives, for example. Quantum histories still play a roˆle in
these theories as usually interpreted, but it is certainly possible to interpret them so as to
ascribe no ontological status to the evolving quantum state, in which case quantum histo-
ries have no ontological status either, and the orderings amongst them become physically
irrelevant.
In this paper, which focusses on the relation between quantum histories and orderings,
I take it for granted — as an interesting hypothesis, not a dogma — that quantum histories
have some ontological status. I will focus on the consistent histories approach. This is not
to suggest that there are no other interesting quantum histories approaches. Other ideas are
outlined in Ref. [8], Section VII of Ref. [9], and Ref. [10], for example. But the discussion
of this paper is best carried out within some specific formulation quantum theory, and
consistent histories is the most widely studied example. As an approach to closed system
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quantum histories, it has many interesting features. Its main drawback is that it does not
solve the measurement problem, which in the language of consistent histories takes the
form of a set selection problem. The search for ways to refine the definition of consistency
in order to solve, or at least reduce, the set selection problem is an independent motivation
for the definition of ordered consistency proposed below.
2. Partial Ordering of Quantum Histories
We consider versions of quantum theory that assign probabilities to histories— i.e., to
collections of events. There are several reasonably standard ways of representing an event
in quantum theory. The simplest is as a projection operator, labelled by a particular time,
corresponding to a statement about an observable in non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
Thus, the statement that a particle was in the interval I at time t is represented by the
projection
PI =
∫
x∈I
|x〉〈x|d3x . (2.1)
The representation of events as projections can be generalised to quantum effects[11,12,10],
defined by operators A such that A and I − A are both positive.2 Events can also be
defined, at least formally, in the path integral version of quantum theory by dividing the
set of paths into exclusive subsets. For example, by considering the appropriate integrals
one can attach probabilities to the events that a particle did, or did not, enter a particular
region of space-time[13]. Further generalisations have been discussed by Isham, Linden
and collaborators.[5,14,15]
2 Different definitions can be found: this, the simplest, is adequate for our purposes.
4
Each of these representations has a natural partial ordering. For projections, we take
A ≥ B if the range of B is a subspace of that of A. This corresponds to the logical
implication of Copenhagen quantum theory already mentioned: if the state of a quantum
system lies in the range of B, then it necessarily lies in the range of A. For quantum effects,
we take A ≥ B if and only if (A−B) is positive. For events defined by the position space
path integral, we take the statement that a particle entered R1 to imply the statement
that it entered R2 if R1 ⊆ R2.
We define a quantum history as a collection of quantum events and extend the par-
tial ordering to histories in the natural way. For example, if we take quantum histo-
ries in non-relativistic quantum mechanics to be defined by sequences of projections at
different fixed times, we compare two quantum histories H = {A1, t1; . . . ;An; tn} and
H ′ = {A′1, t′1; . . . ;A
′
n′ , t
′
n′} as follows. First add to each history the identity operator at ev-
ery time at which it contains no proposition and the other does, so obtaining relabelled rep-
resentations of the histories as H = {A1, T1; . . . ;AN ;TN} and H ′ = {A′1, T1; . . . ;A′N , TN}.
Then define the partial ordering by taking H ≥ H ′ if and only if Ai ≥ A′i for all i and
H > H ′ if H ≥ H ′ and H 6= H ′. This ordering was first considered in the consistent
histories literature by Isham and Linden[14], whose work, and its relation to the ideas of
this paper, are discussed in the Appendix.
3. Consistent Histories
The consistent sets of histories for a closed quantum system are defined in terms of
the space of states H, the initial density matrix ρ, and the hamiltonian H. In the simplest
version of the consistent histories formulation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, sets
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of histories correspond to sets of projective decompositions. In order to be able to give
a physical interpretation of any of the consistent sets, we need also to assume that stan-
dard observables, such as position, momentum and spin, are given. Individual quantum
events are defined by members of projective decompositions of the identity into orthogonal
hermitian projections σ = {P i}, with
∑
i
P i = 1 and P iP j = δijP
i . (3.1)
Each such decomposition defines a complete and exclusive list of events at some fixed time,
and a time label is thus generally attached to the decompositions and the projections: the
labels are omitted here, since the properties of interest here depend only on the time
ordering of events.
Suppose now we have a set of decompositions S = {σ1, . . . , σn}. Then the histories
given by choosing one projection from each of the decompositions σj in all possible ways
define an exhaustive and exclusive set of alternatives. We follow Gell-Mann and Hartle’s
definitions, and say that S is a consistent (or medium decoherent) set of histories if
Tr(P inn . . . P
i1
1 ρP
j1
1 . . . P
jn
n ) = δi1j1 . . . δinjnp(i1 . . . in) . (3.2)
When S is consistent, p(i1 . . . in) is the probability of the history H = {P i11 , . . . , P inn }. We
will want later to discuss the properties of individual histories without reference to any
fixed consistent set, and we define a consistent history to be a history which belongs to
some consistent set S. Finally, we say the set
S′ = {σ1, . . . , σk, τ, σk+1, . . . , σn} (3.3)
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is a consistent extension of a consistent set of histories S = {σ1, . . . , σn} by the set of
projections τ = {Qi : i = 1, . . . , m} if τ is a projective decomposition and S′ is consistent.
Suppose now that we have a collection of data defined by the history
H = {P i11 , . . . , P inn } (3.4)
which has non-zero probability and belongs to the consistent set S. This history might,
for example, describe the results of a series of experiments or the observations made by
an observer. Given a choice of consistent extension S′ of S, we can make probabilistic
inferences conditioned on the historyH. For example, if S′ has the above form, the histories
extending H in S′ are Hi = {P i11 , . . . , P ikk , Qi, P ik+1k+1 , . . . , P inn } and the proposition Qi has
conditional probability
p(Qi|H) = p(Hi)/p(H) . (3.5)
These probabilities and conditional probabilities are the same in every consistent set which
includes Hi and (hence) H. However, when we want to emphasize that the calculation
can be carried out in some particular set S, we will attach a suffix. For example, we might
write pS′(Q
i|H) = pS′(Hi)/pS(H) for the above equation.
The formalism itself gives no way of choosing any particular consistent extension. In
the view of the original developers of the consistent histories approach, the different S′ are
to be thought of as ways of producing possible pictures of the past and future physics of the
system which, though generally incompatible, are all equally valid. More formally, they
can be seen as incompatible logical structures which allow different classes of inferences
from the data[16,17].
7
It is this freedom in the choice of consistent extension which, it has been argued
elsewhere[9,18,19,20,21,22,23,10] gives rise to the most serious problems in the consistent
histories approach. Standard probabilistic predictions and deterministic retrodictions can
be reproduced in the consistent histories formalism by making an ad hoc choice of consis-
tent set, but cannot be derived from the formalism itself. In fact, it is almost never possible
to make any unambiguous predictions or retrodictions: there are almost always an infi-
nite number of incompatible consistent extensions of the set containing a given history
dataset[9,20].
The problem is not simply that the formalism supplies descriptions of physics which
are complementary in the standard sense, although that in itself is sufficient to ensure
that the formalism is only very weakly predictive. Even on the assumption that we will
continue to observe quasiclassical physics, no known interpretation of the formalism allows
us to derive the predictions of classical mechanics and Copenhagen quantum theory.[18].
Hence the set selection problem: probabilistic predictions can only be made conditional on
a choice of consistent set, yet the consistent histories formalism gives no way of singling
out any particular set or sets as physically interesting.
One possible solution to the set selection problem would be an axiom which identifies
a unique physically interesting set, or perhaps a class of such sets, from the initial state
and the dynamics. Another would be the identification of a physically natural measure
on the space of consistent sets, according to which the physically relevant consistent set
is randomly chosen. Possible set selection criteria have been investigated[24,25], but no
generally workable criterion has emerged.3
3 With different motivations, Gell-Mann and Hartle have explored a “strong decoherence”
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4. Consistent Sets and Contrary Inferences: A Brief Review
A further reason for believing that the consistent histories formalism is at best in-
complete comes from considering the logical relations among events in different consistent
sets. We say that two projection operators P and Q are complementary if they do not
commute: PQ 6= QP . We say that they are contradictory if they sum to the identity, so
that P = 1−Q and PQ = QP = 0, and that they are contrary if they are orthogonal and
not contradictory, so that PQ = QP = 0 and P < 1−Q.
Contradictory inferences are never possible in the consistent histories formalism, but
it is easy to find examples of contrary inferences from the same data.[19] For instance,
consider a quantum system whose hamiltonian is zero and whose Hilbert space H has
dimension greater than two, prepared in the state |a〉. Suppose that the system is left
undisturbed from time 0 until time t, when it is observed in the state |c〉, where 0 <
|〈 a | c 〉| ≤ 1/3: i.e. a single quantum measurement is made, and the outcome probability
is less than 1/9. In consistent histories language, we have initial density matrix ρ = |a〉〈a|
and the single datum corresponding to the history H = {Pc} from the consistent set
S = {{Pc, 1− Pc}}, where the projection Pc = |c〉〈c| is taken at time t.
Now consider consistent extensions of S of the form Sb = {{Pb, 1−Pb}, {Pc, 1−Pc}},
where Pb = |b〉〈b| for some normalised vector |b〉 with the property that
〈 c | b 〉 〈 b | a 〉 = 〈 c | a 〉 . (4.1)
It is easy to verify that Sb is consistent and that the conditional probability of Pb given
H is 1. It is also easy to see that there are at least two mutually orthogonal vectors |b〉
criterion which is intended to reduce the number of consistent sets.[26] However, under their
present definition, every consistent set is strongly decoherent.[10]
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satisfying (4.1). For example, let |v1〉, |v2〉, |v3〉 be orthonormal vectors and take |a〉 = |v1〉
and |c〉 = λ|v1〉+ µ|v2〉, where |λ|2 + |µ|2 = 1. Then the vectors
|b±〉 = (|λ|2 + |µ|
2
x
)−1/2(λ|v1〉+ µ
x
|v2〉 ± (x− 1)
1/2µ
x
|v3〉) (4.2)
both satisfy (4.1) and are orthogonal if x is real and x2|λ|2 = (x − 2)(1 − |λ|2), which
has solutions for |λ| ≤ 1/3. Thus the consistent sets Sb± give contrary probability one
retrodictions.
Some brief historical remarks are in order. The existence of contrary inferences in the
consistent histories formalism, though easy to show, was noticed only quite recently. In
particular, it was not known to the formalism’s original developers.4 It was first explicitly
pointed out, and its implications for the consistent histories formalism were first examined,
in Ref. [19]. Further discussion can be found in Refs. [27,28]. However, a noteworthy ear-
lier consistent histories analysis of an example in which contrary inferences arise can be
found in a critique by Cohen[29] of Aharonov and Vaidman’s interpretation[30] of one of
their intriguing examples of pre- and post-selection.5 As noted in Ref. [19], Cohen’s anal-
ysis miscontrues the consistency criterion: however, this error does not affect its derivation
of contrary inferences.
Now, the existence of contrary inferences in the consistent histories formalism needs
to be interpreted with care. It is not true that, in any given consistent set, two different
contrary propositions can be inferred with probability one. The inferences made within
any given consistent set lead to no contradiction. The picture of physics given by any
4 I am grateful to Bob Griffiths, Jim Hartle, and Roland Omne`s for helpful correspondence on
this point.
5 I am grateful to Oliver Cohen and Lucien Hardy for drawing this reference to my attention.
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given consistent set may or may not be considered natural or plausible — depending
on one’s intuition and the criteria one uses for naturality — but it is not logically self-
contradictory. It is however true, as a mathematical statement about the properties of
the consistent histories formalism, that the propositions inferred in the two different sets
correspond to contrary projections. The formalism makes no physical distinction among
different consistent sets, and so requires us to conclude that two equally valid pictures of
physics can be given, in which contrary events take place.
To put it more formally, the consistent histories approach can be interpreted as setting
out rules of reasoning according to which, although physics can be described by any of
infinitely many equally valid pictures, only one of those pictures may be considered in
any given argument. Such an interpretation ensures — tautologically — that no logical
contradiction arises, even when the pictures contain contrary inferences.
The consistent histories formalism, in other words, gives a set of rules for producing
possible pictures of physics within quantum theory, and these rules themselves lead to
no logical inconsistency. However, consistent historians claim much more, arguing that
the formalism defines a natural and scientifically unproblematic interpretation of quantum
theory. Indeed, the consistent histories literature tends to suggest that the descriptions
of physics given by consistent historians are simply and evidently the correct descriptions
which emerge from quantum theory, so that, in querying them, one necessarily queries
quantum theory itself.6
This seems patently false. The most basic premise of consistent historians — that
6 For example, the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics has been referred
to as “the interpretation of quantum mechanics”[16] and even as simply “quantum mechanics”[31].
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quantum theory is correctly interpreted by some sort of many-picture scheme — leads to
such trouble in explaining which particular picture we see, and why, that cautious scep-
ticism seems only appropriate. Even if the premise were accepted, it would be essential
to ask, of any particular many-picture scheme, whether its assumptions are natural and
whether the descriptions of nature it produces are physically plausible or scientifically
useful. The particular equations used to define consistent sets are, after all, simply inter-
esting guesses: there is no compelling theoretical justification for them, and indeed, several
different definitions of consistency have been proposed[1,4,32].
My own view is that there are a number of compelling reasons for regarding the consis-
tent histories interpretation, as it is presently understood, as scientifically unsatisfactory.
However, as these questions have been explored in some detail elsewhere[9,18,19,27,28,20-
23,10], I here comment only on two specific problems raised by contrary inferences.
First, the fact that we are to take as equally valid and correct pictures of physics which
include contrary inferences goes against many well developed intuitions. No argument
based on intuition alone can be conclusive, but I think it must be granted that this one
has some force. What use, it may reasonably be asked, is there in saying that in one
picture of reality a particle genuinely went, with probability one, through slit A, and that
in another picture the particle went, also with probability one, through the disjoint slit B?
Why should we take either picture seriously, given the other?
On this point, it is worth noting that one of the advertised merits of the consistent his-
tories formalism[1,16,17], is that it, unlike the Copenhagen interpretation, accommodates
some (arguably) plausible intuitions about the behaviour of microsystems in between ob-
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servations. For example, the formalism allows us to say — albeit only as one of an infinite
number of incompatible descriptions — that a particle observed at a particular detector
was travelling towards that detector before the observation, and that a particle measured
to have spin component σx = sx had that spin before the measurement took place. As
Griffiths and Omne`s note,[1,16] informal discussions of experiments are often framed in
terms which, if taken literally, suggest that we can make this sort of statement about
microsystems before a measurement is carried out. (“Was the beam correctly aligned go-
ing into the second interferometer?”, or “Do you think something crazy in the electronics
might have triggered [detector] number 3 just before the particle got there?”[1], for ex-
ample.) Their intuition is that a good interpretation of quantum theory ought to give a
way of allowing us to take such statements literally — a criterion which, they suggest, the
consistent histories approach satisfies.
The intuition is, of course, controversial. A counter-intuition, which most interpre-
tations of quantum theory support, is that any description of a microsystem before a
measurement is carried out should be independent of the result of that measurement.
In any case, to the extent that any intuition is offered as a justification of the for-
malism, it seems reasonable to consider the fact that the formalism violates other strongly
held intuitions. Few experimenters, after all, can ever have intuitively concluded that
the entire flux of their beam can sensibly be thought of as having followed any of several
macroscopically distinct paths through the apparatus. Yet this is what the above example,
translated into an interference experiment, implies.
The second, and probably deeper, problem is that it seems very hard to justify the
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distinction, which consistent historians are forced to draw, between contradictory infer-
ences, which are regarded as a priori unacceptable, and contrary inferences, which are
regarded as unproblematic. Some justification seems called for, since the distinction is
not an accidental feature: it is not that the formalism, for unrelated reasons, simply hap-
pens to exclude one type of inference and include the other. The definition of consistency
is motivated precisely by the notion that, when two different sets allow a calculation of
the probability of the same event (belonging, in the simplest case, to a single history in
one set and a combination of two histories in the other), the calculations should agree.
This requires in particular that contradictory propositions P and (1 − P ) can never be
inferred, since if the probability of P is one in any set, it must be one in all sets, and so
the probability of (1− P ) must be zero in all sets.
Now this last requirement is not absolutely essential, sensible though it may seem. No
logical contradiction arises in an interpretation of quantum theory which follows the basic
interpretational ideas of the consistent histories formalism but which accepts all complete
sets of disjoint quantum histories, whether consistent or not, as defining valid pictures of
physics[9,10]. In this “inconsistent histories” interpretation, contradictory inferences can
generally be made by using different pictures. This possibility is excluded by a deliberate
theoretical choice.
It seems natural, then, having made this choice, to look for ways in which contrary
inferences can similarly be excluded. This is the line of thought pursued below. Note,
however, that the problem of contrary inferences is not the only motivation for the ideas
introduced below. Whatever one’s view of the consistent histories formalism, it is inter-
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esting that an alternative formalism can be defined relatively simply. It seems fruitful to
ask which, if either, is to be preferred, and why. And, as we will see, ordered consistent
sets raise independently interesting questions about the quasiclassical world we actually
observe.
5. Relation of Contrary Inferences and Subspace Implications
A contrary inference arises when there exist two consistent sets, S1 and S2, both
containing a history H, with the property that there are orthogonal propositions P1 and
P2 which are implied by H in the respective sets, so that — temporarily adding set suffices
for clarity — we have
pS1(P1|H) = pS2(P2|H) = 1 . (5.1)
Now pS2((1−P2)|H) = 0, and since the probabilities are set-independent and pS1(P1|H) is
nonzero, we cannot have P1 = 1−P2. Hence, since P1 and P2 are orthogonal, we have that
P1 < 1 − P2. Since p(P1|H) = 1 and p((1 − P2)|H) = 0, this pair of projections violates
the subspace implication P1 ⇒ 1− P2. That is, a contrary inference implies the existence
of consistent histories H and H ′, belonging to different consistent sets and agreeing on
all but one projector, such that H has non-zero probability, H ′ has zero probability, and
H < H ′: in the example of the last section, for instance, we have H = {Pb+ , Pc} and
H ′ = {(1− Pb−), Pc}.
Clearly, according to the consistent histories formalism, an observation of the datum
Pb+ cannot be taken to imply an observation of the strictly larger projector (1−Pb−). To
make that inference would lead directly to a contradiction, in the form of the realisation
15
of a probability zero history, if Pc were subsequently observed.
Now it is easy to produce real world examples of contrary inferences, so long as
those inferences are of unobserved quantities. As we have seen, it requires only a three-
dimensional quantum system, prepared in one state, isolated, and then observed in another
state — hardly a taxing experiment.
It is not obvious, though, that we can produce examples where subspace implications
fail in a realistic consistent histories description of observations of laboratory experiments,
or more generally of macroscopic quasiclassical physics. That general consistent histories
violate subspace implications need not necessarily imply that the particular consistent
histories used to recover standard descriptions of real world physics do so. Both in order
to address this question, and for its own sake, it is interesting to ask whether there might
be any alternative treatment of quantum theory within the consistent histories framework
which respects subspace implications, at least when they relate two consistent histories.
The next section suggests such a treatment.
6. Ordered Consistent Sets of Histories
We have already seen that there is a natural partial ordering for each of the standard
representations of quantum histories in the consistent histories approach. The probability
weight defines a second partial ordering: H ≺ H ′ if p(H) < p(H ′). The violation of
subspace implications reflects the disagreement between these two partial orderings in the
consistent histories formalism: we can have both H < H ′ and H ≻ H ′. The aim of this
section is to develop a history-based interpretation which restricts attention to collections
of quantum histories on which the two orderings do not disagree.
We begin at the level of individual quantum histories, defining an ordered consistent
history, H, to be a consistent history with the properties that:
(i) for all consistent histories H ′ with H ′ ≥ H we have that p(H ′) ≥ p(H);
(ii) for all consistent histories H ′ with H ′ ≤ H we have that p(H ′) ≤ p(H).
Recall that a consistent history is any quantum history which belongs to some con-
sistent set of histories. Properties (i) and (ii) hold trivially for histories H and H ′ which
belong to the same consistent set: it is the comparison across different sets which makes
them useful constraints.
We now define an ordered consistent set of histories to be a complete set of exclusive
alternative histories, each of which is ordered consistent. We can then define an ordered
consistent histories approach to quantum theory in precise analogy to the consistent histo-
ries approach, using the same definition of probability weight and the same interpretation,
simply declaring by fiat that only ordered consistent sets of histories are to be considered.7
The following lemmas show that, within the projection operator formulation, ordered
consistent sets of histories do indeed exist.8
Lemma 1: Any consistent history H = {P1, . . . , Pn} defined by a series of pro-
jections which include a minimal projection Pj , so that Pi ≥ Pj for all i, is an ordered
consistent history.
7 Note that there are other collections of quantum histories on which the orderings do not
disagree. For example, if all the consistent historiesH that violate (i) are eliminated, the remainder
form a collection on which the orderings do not disagree and which is not obviously identical to
the ordered consistent histories, and similarly for (ii). It might be interesting to explore such
alternatives, but we restrict attention to the ordered consistent histories here.
8 I am grateful to Bob Griffiths for suggesting a slight extension of Lemma 1.
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Proof: Suppose H ′ = {P ′1, . . . , P ′n} is a larger history than H, and write P ′i =
Pj +Qi. We have that
p(H ′) = Tr(P ′n . . . P
′
1ρP
′
1 . . . P
′
n)
= Tr((Pj +Qn) . . . (Pj +Q1)ρ(Pj +Q1) . . . (Pj +Qn))
= Tr(Pjρ) + Tr(Qn . . .Q1ρQ1 . . .Qn)
≥ Tr(Pjρ)
= p(H) .
(6.1)
Now suppose that H ′ is smaller than H. Then in particular P ′j ≤ Pj and we have that
p(H ′) ≤ Tr(P ′jρ)
≤ Tr(Pjρ)
= p(H) .
(6.2)
Lemma 2: Let S = {σ1, . . . , σn} be a consistent set of histories defined by a series
of projective decompositions, of which one, σj , has the property that for each projection
P in σj , and for every i, we have that there is precisely one projection Q in σi with the
property that Q ≥ P (so that all of the other projections in σi are contrary to P ). Then
S is an ordered consistent set of histories.
Proof: Each of the histories of non-zero probability in S satisfies the conditions
of Lemma 1 and so is ordered consistent. Each of the histories of zero probability in S is
of the form H = {. . . , P, . . . , Q, . . .}, where P and Q are contrary projections. Now any
consistent history smaller than H therefore also contains a pair of contrary projections
P ′ ≤ P and Q′ ≤ Q. By the consistency axioms, its probability is less than or equal to
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Tr(Q′P ′ρP ′Q′) = 0, and thus must also be zero. Hence H is ordered consistent, since any
consistent history larger than H has probability greater than or equal to zero.
7. Ordered Consistent Sets and Quasiclassicality
A formalism based on ordered consistent sets of histories obviously defines a more
strongly predictive version of quantum theory than that defined by the existing consistent
histories framework, since it allows strictly fewer sets as possible descriptions of physics.
But can it describe our empirical observations?
The question subdivides. Are quasiclassical domains generally ordered consistent sets
of histories? Is our own quasiclassical domain one? If not, are its histories generally or-
dered when compared to histories belonging to other consistent sets defined by projections
onto ranges of the same quasiclassical variables? For example, can we show that consistent
histories defined by projections onto ranges of densities for chemical species in small vol-
umes are generally ordered with respect to one another? If so, then the type of subspace
implication which is generally used in analyses of observations could still be justified. Fi-
nally, if either of the previous two properties fail to hold, it would be useful to quantify
the extent to which they fail.
Answering any of these questions definitively may require — and, it might be hoped,
help to develop — a deeper understanding of quasiclassicality than is available to us at
present. I at any rate do not know the answers, and can only offer the questions as
interesting ones whose resolution would have significant implications. At least ordered
consistency does not seem to fall at the first hurdle: ordered consistent sets are shown
below to be adequate to describe quasiclassicality in simple models.
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As a simple example, consider the following model of a series of successive measure-
ments of the spin of a spin-1/2 particle about various axes. We use a vector notation for
the particle states, so that if u is a unit vector in R3 the eigenstates of σ.u are represented
by | ± u〉. With the analogy of a pointer state in mind, we use the basis {| ↑〉k, | ↓〉k}
to represent the kth environment particle state, together with the linear combinations
|±〉k = (| ↑〉k ± | ↓〉k)/
√
2. We compactify the notation by writing environment states as
single kets, so that for example | ↑〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ | ↑〉n is written as | ↑ . . . ↑〉, and we take the
initial state |ψ(0)〉 to be |v〉 ⊗ | ↑ . . . ↑〉.
The interaction between the system and the kth environment particle is chosen so that
it corresponds to a measurement of the system spin along the uk direction, so that the
states evolve as follows:
|uk〉 ⊗ | ↑〉k → |uk〉 ⊗ | ↑〉k ,
|−uk〉 ⊗ | ↑〉k → |−uk〉 ⊗ | ↓〉k .
(7.1)
A simple unitary operator that generates this evolution is
Uk(t) = P (uk)⊗ Ik + P (−uk)⊗ exp(−iθk(t)Fk) , (7.2)
where P (x) = |x〉〈x| and Fk = i| ↓〉k〈↑ |k − i| ↑〉k〈↓ |k. Here θk(t) is a function defined
for each particle k, which varies from 0 to π/2 and represents how far the interaction has
progressed. We define Pk(±) = |±〉k〈±|k, so that Fk = Pk(+) − Pk(−).
The Hamiltonian for this interaction is thus
Hk(t) = iU˙k(t)U
†
k(t) = θ˙k(t)P (−uk)⊗ Fk , (7.3)
in both the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures. We write the extension of Uk to the total
Hilbert space as
Vk = P (uk)⊗I1⊗· · ·⊗In+P (−uk)⊗I1⊗· · ·⊗Ik−1⊗exp(−iθk(t)Fk)⊗Ik+1⊗· · ·⊗In . (7.4)
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We take the system particle to interact initially with particle 1 and then with consecutively
numbered ones, and there is no interaction between environment particles, so that the
evolution operator for the complete system is
U(t) = Vn(t) . . . V1(t) , (7.5)
with each factor affecting only the Hilbert spaces of the system and one of the environment
spins.
We suppose, finally, that the interactions take place in disjoint time intervals and that
the first interaction begins at t = 0, so that the total Hamiltonian is simply
H(t) =
n∑
k=1
Hk(t) , (7.6)
and we have that θ1(t) > 0 for t > 0 and that, if 0 < θk(t) < π/2, then θi(t) =
π/2 for all i < k and θi(t) = 0 for all i > k.
This model has been used elsewhere[25,33] in order to explore algorithms which might
select a single physically natural consistent set when the physics is determined by the
simplest type of system-environment interaction. It is particularly well suited to such
an analysis, since the dynamics are chosen so as to allow a simple and quite elegant
classification[33] of all the consistent sets built from projections onto subspaces defined by
the Schmidt decomposition. Apart from this, though, the model is unexceptional — one
of the simpler variants among the many models used in the literature to investigate the
decoherence of system states by measurement-type interactions with an environment.
To give a physical interpretation of the model, we take it that the environment
“pointer” variables assume definite values after their respective interactions with the sys-
tem. That is, after the kth interaction, the kth environment particle is in one of the states
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| ↑〉k and | ↓〉k: the probabilities of each of these outcomes depend on the outcome of the
previous measurement (or, in the case of the first measurement, on the initial state) via
the standard quantum mechanical expressions.
This description can be recovered from the consistent histories formalism by choosing
the consistent set S1, defined by the decompositions
{I ⊗ |ǫ1〉1〈ǫ1|1 ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I : ǫ1 =↑ or ↓} at time t1 ,
{I ⊗ |ǫ1〉1〈ǫ1|1 ⊗ |ǫ2〉2〈ǫ2|2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ I : ǫ1, ǫ2 =↑ or ↓} at time t2 ,
. . .
{I ⊗ |ǫ1〉1〈ǫ1|1 ⊗ |ǫ2〉2〈ǫ2|2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ǫn〉n〈ǫn|n : ǫ1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫn =↑ or ↓} at time tn .
(7.7)
Clearly, the histories of non-zero probability in S1 take the form
Hǫ1,...,ǫn = {I ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I,
I ⊗ |ǫ1〉1〈ǫ1|1 ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I,
I ⊗ |ǫ1〉1〈ǫ1|1 ⊗ |ǫ2〉2〈ǫ2|2 ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I,
. . . ,
I ⊗ |ǫ1〉1〈ǫ1|1 ⊗ |ǫ2〉2〈ǫ2|2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ǫn〉n〈ǫn|n} ,
(7.8)
for sequences {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn}, each element of which takes the value ↑ or ↓. Their probabilities,
defined by the decoherence functional, are precisely those which would be obtained from
standard quantum theory by treating each interaction as a measurement:
p(Hǫ1,...,ǫn) = (
1 + a1v.u1
2
)(
1 + a2u1.u2
2
) . . . (
1 + anun−1.un
2
) , (7.9)
where, letting ǫ0 =↑, we define ai = 1 if ǫi and ǫi−1 take the same value, and ai = −1
otherwise.
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Now S1 is defined by a nested sequence of increasingly refined projective decompo-
sitions, all of whose projections commute — a relation which is unaltered by moving to
the Heisenberg picture. It therefore satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2 above, and so is
ordered consistent.
This argument clearly generalizes: in any situation in which Hilbert space factorizes
into system and environment degrees of freedom, where the self-interactions of the latter
are negligible, any consistent set defined by nested commuting projections onto the en-
vironment variables is ordered consistent. The model considered above is a particularly
crude example: more sophisticated, and phenomenologically somewhat more plausible,
examples of this type are analysed in, for example, Refs. [26,32].
No sweeping conclusion can be drawn from this, since it is generally agreed that
familiar quasiclassical physics is not well described in general — at least in any obvious
way — by models of this type. (Again, a detailed discussion of the limitations of such
models can be found in Refs. [26,32].) In other words, while it would be hard to defend
the hypothesis that familiar quasiclassical sets are generally ordered consistent if sets of
the type S1 were not, the fact that they are is certainly not sufficient evidence. It would
be good to find sharper tests of the hypothesis, perhaps for example by developing further
the phenomenological investigations of quasiclassicality pursued in Ref. [26]. Meanwhile,
the questions raised earlier in this section remain unresolved.
On the other hand, it would be difficult to make a watertight case that ordered
consistent sets are definitely inadequate to describe real-world physics, for the following
reason. First, it seems hard to exclude the possibility that the initial state is pure, so let us
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temporarily suppose that it is: ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. As Gell-Mann and Hartle point out[32], we can
then associate to every consistent set of histories, S, a nested set of commuting projections
defining what they term generalized records. The consistent set defines a resolution of the
initial state into history vectors,
|ψ〉 =
∑
i1,...,in
P inn . . . P
i1
1 |ψ〉 , (7.10)
which are guaranteed to be orthogonal by the consistency condition (3.2). We can thus
find at least one set of orthogonal projection operators {RI}, indexed by sets of the form
I = {i1 . . . in}, which project onto the history vectors and sum to the identity:
Ri1...in |ψ〉 = P inn . . . P i11 |ψ〉 ,
∑
I
RI = I ,
RIRJ = δIJRJ .
(7.11)
We can thus[32] construct a set S′, with the same history vectors and the same probabilities
as S, built from a nested sequence of commuting projections defined by sums of the RI .
And, as we have seen, sets of this type are ordered consistent.
There is no reason to expect the projections defining the set S′ to be closely related
to those defining S. In particular, the fact that S is a quasiclassical domain certainly does
not imply that S′ is likely to be: its projections are not generally likely to be interpretable
in terms of familiar variables. But, as we have already noted, we have no theoretical
criterion which identifies a particular consistent set, or a particular type of variable, as
fundamentally correct for representing the events we observe. The set S′ correctly identifies
the history vectors and predicts their probabilities, and we thus could not say for certain
(given that we presently have no theory of set selection) that its description of physics is
fundamentally incorrect, while that given by S is fundamentally correct.
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To make this observation is merely to point out a logical possibility. In fact, it would
be extremely puzzling if the more complicated and apparently derivative set S′ were in
some sense more fundamental than the associated quasiclassical domain S. And even if
this were somehow understood to be true in principle, we would still need to understand
the relationship between between ordered consistency and quasiclassicality in order to say
whether or not standardly used subspace inferences are in fact justifiable.
8. Ordering and Ordering Violations: Interpretation
However, one of the main points of this paper — and the main reason for taking a
particular interest in the properties of ordered consistent sets — is that either answer leads
to an interesting conclusion.
If our empirical observations can be accounted for by the predictions of an ordered
consistent set, then the ordered consistent sets formalism supersedes the current versions of
the consistent histories formalism as a predictive theory. Alternatively, if the predictions of
ordered consistent histories quantum theory are false, then either the consistent histories
framework uses entirely the wrong language to describe histories of events in quantum
theory, or we cannot generally rely on subspace implications in analysing our observations.
Either of these last two possibilities would have far-reaching implications for our un-
derstanding of nature. It is true that other ways of representing quantum histories are
known than those used in the consistent histories formalism, but they arise either in non-
standard versions of quantum theory, such as de Broglie–Bohm theory, or in alternative
theories. It is also true that there is no way of logically excluding the possibility that
subspace implications generally fail to hold. Any clear violation would, however, lead to
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radical changes in our representation of the world, and in particular to our understanding
of the relation between theory and empirical observation.
I would suggest, however, that any version of closed system quantum theory in which
the two orderings disagree leads to radical new interpretational problems. The fundamental
problem is that, supposing that the world we experience is described by one particular
realised quantum history, we never know — no matter how precise we try to make our
observations — exactly what form that history takes. This is not only because we can never
completely eliminate imprecision from our experimental observations. A deeper problem
is that we have no theoretical understanding of how, precisely, an observation should be
represented within quantum theory. We do not know precisely when and where any given
observation takes place. Nor do we know whether is fundamentally correct to represent
quantum events by projection operators, by quantum effects, by statements associated to
space-time regions in path integral quantum theory, or in some other way — let alone
precisely which operator, effect, or statement correctly represents any given event. As a
result, we are always forced into guesswork and approximation. We are forced to assume,
at least as a working hypothesis, that we can find sensible bounds on our observations.
Roughly speaking, we assume that we can say, at least, that a photon hit our photographic
plate within a certain region, that the observed flux from a distant star was in a certain
range, and so forth.9 We assume also that the probability of the actual observations —
whose precise form we do not know — is bounded by the probability of the observations
9 In fact such statements are generally made within statistical confidence limits. To consider
statistical statements would complicate the discussion a little, but does not alter the underlying
point.
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as we approximately represent them. These assumptions ultimately rely on the agreement
of two orderings just mentioned: when those orderings disagree, we therefore run into new
problems.
It is easy to see, in particular, that this sort of problem arises in any careful consistent
histories treatment of quantum cosmology. Suppose, for example, that we have a sequence
of cosmological events which we wish to represent theoretically, in order to calculate their
probability, given some theory of the boundary conditions. Assuming that the basic prin-
ciples of the consistent histories formalism are correct, we know that these events should
be represented by some history H belonging to some consistent set S. We do not, however,
know the precise form of H or of S: the events are given to us as empirical observations
rather than as mathematical constructs.
The best we can then do, following the general principles of the consistent histories
formalism, is choose some plausible consistent set S′ containing histories Hmin and Hmax
which we guess to have the property Hmin < H < Hmax: in particular, thus, we choose
Hmin < Hmax. Since Hmin and Hmax belong to the same set, we have that p(Hmin) <
p(Hmax). It might naively be hoped that we can derive that p(Hmin) < p(H) < p(Hmax),
but since H in general will belong to a different consistent set from Hmin and Hmax,
this does not generally follow. There is no way to bound p(H), except (in principle) by
performing the enormous task of explicitly calculating the probabilities of all consistent
histories bounded by Hmin and Hmax, and there is no way to justify the type of subspace
implication — relating observations and true data — that we generally take for granted.
This is not to say that the disagreement of the two orderings necessarily leads to
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logical contradiction. Versions of quantum theory in which the orderings disagree need not
be inconsistent, or even impossible to test precisely. They do, though, generally seem to
require us to identify precisely the correct representation of our observations in quantum
theory. This is generally a far from trivial problem: how are we to tell, a priori, exactly
which projection operators represent the results of a series of quantum measurements? It is
not impossible to imagine that theoretical criteria could be found which solve the problem,
but we certainly do not have such criteria at present.
9. Conclusions
Though the criterion of ordering seems mathematically natural, both in the consis-
tent histories approach to quantum theory and in other possible treatments of quantum
histories, it raises very unconventional questions. It seems, though, that these questions
cannot be avoided in any precise formulation of the quantum theory of a closed system
which involves a standard representation of quantum events and which gives a historical
account.
There seem to be three possibilities, each of which is interesting. The first is that the
representations of quantum histories discussed here, though standard, are not those chosen
by nature. Clearly this is a possibility: there are, for example, well known non-standard
versions of quantum theory[6], and related theories[7], in which histories are defined by
trajectories or other auxiliary variables, and in which subspace implications follow just as
in classical physics.
The second possibility is that our quasiclassical domain can be shown to be an ordered
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consistent set. If so, then the ordered consistent histories approach is both predictively
stronger than the standard consistent histories approach — since there are fewer ordered
consistent sets — and compatible with empirical observation, and hence superior as a
predictive theory. If it is compatible with our observations, the ordered consistent histories
approach would seem at least as natural as the consistent histories approach.
Even if so, I would not suggest that the ordered consistent histories formalism is
the “right” interpretation of quantum theory, and the consistent histories approach the
“wrong” one. The ordered consistent histories approach seems almost certain to suffer from
many of the same defects as the consistent histories approach, since there are still far too
many ordered consistent sets. The aim here is thus not to propose the ordered consistent
histories approach as a plausible fundamental interpretation of quantum theory, but to
suggest that the range of natural and useful mathematical definitions of types of quantum
history is wider than previously understood. This range includes, at least, Goldstein
and Page’s criterion of linear positivity[34], the various consistency criteria[1,26,32] in the
literature, and the criterion of ordered consistency introduced here. It seems to me hard to
justify taking any of these criteria as defining the fundamentally correct interpretation of
quantum theory. On the one hand, physically interesting quantum histories might possibly
satisfy any one, or none, of them; on the other hand, most quantum histories satisfying any
given criterion seem unlikely to be physically interesting — and precisely which criteria
are useful in which circumstances largely remains to be understood.
The third possibility is that our quasiclassical domain is not an ordered consistent set.
This would have intriguing theoretical implications. We would have, at least in principle,
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to abandon subspace inferences, and we would ultimately need to understand precisely
how to characterise the quantum events which constitute the history we observe. This
would raise profound and not easily answerable questions about how we can tell what,
precisely, are our empirical observations. It might also, depending on the way in which
ordered consistency was violated, and the extent of any violation, raise significant practical
problems in the analysis of those observations.
No compelling argument in favour of any one of these possibilities has been given here:
it has been shown only that, if quasiclassical sets generally fail to be ordered consistent,
they do so in a way too subtle to be displayed in the simplest models.
Another caveat is that the above discussion applied the criterion of ordered consistency
only to the simplest representation of quantum histories, in which individual events are
represented by projections at a single time. Other representations need to be considered
case by case, and our conclusions might not necessarily generalize. For example, the fact
that a consistent history built from single time projections is ordered when compared to
consistent histories of the same type does not necessarily imply that it is ordered when
compared to consistent histories defined by composite events.
Still, the criterion of ordered consistency defines a new version of the consistent his-
tories formulation of quantum theory, which avoids the problems caused by contrary in-
ferences. Its other properties and implications largely remain to be understood.
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Appendix: Ordering and Decoherence Functionals
This Appendix describes a noteworthy earlier discussion of quantum history orderings,
given by Isham and Linden in Sec. IV of Ref. [14], and its relation to the ideas discussed
here.
Isham and Linden abstract the basic ideas of the consistent histories formalism in the
following way. First, the space UP of history propositions is taken to be a mathematical
structure — an orthoalgebra — with a series of operations and relations obeying certain
axioms. In particular, they propose that a partial ordering ≤ and an orthogonality relation
⊥ should be defined on UP and should obey natural rules, and that UP should include an
identity history 1.
They then introduce a space D of decoherence functionals, defined to be maps from
UP×UP to the complex numbers satisfying certain axioms, and go on to consider whether
the axioms defining decoherence functionals should include axioms relating to the ordering
in UP .
In the language of standard quantum mechanics, UP corresponds to the space of all
the quantum histories (not only the consistent histories) for a given system, whose Hilbert
space and hamiltonian are fixed. Any of several representations of quantum histories
could be considered: the relevant part of Isham and Linden’s discussion uses the simplest
representation of quantum histories, as sequences of projection operators.
The standard quantum mechanical decoherence functional (as appears on the left
hand side of (3.2) ) is a member of the space D in the minimal axiom system Isham and
Linden eventually choose. As they remark, though, it would not be a member of D if the
extra ordering axioms they discuss were imposed. Isham and Linden nonetheless consider
imposing these ordering axioms, since their aim in the relevant discussion is to investigate
generalised algebraic and logical schemes rather than to propose a formalism applicable to
standard quantum theory. (They suggest, at the end of section IV, that standard quantum
theory might perhaps emerge from some such generalised scheme in an appropriate limit.)
Isham and Linden were, as far as I am aware, the first to investigate possible uses of
orderings in developing the consistent histories formalism. It is worth stressing, though,
to avoid any possible confusion, that their suggestions pursue the exploration of orderings
in a direction orthogonal to the one considered in the present paper. In this paper we
restrict attention to standard quantum theory, and propose an alternative histories for-
malism within that theory, using the standard quantum theoretic decoherence functional
throughout. We note also that the subspace implications which underlie our basic scien-
tific worldviews depend for their justification on the assumption that the quasiclassical
set describing the physics we observe is an ordered consistent set. Isham and Linden’s
proposed ordering axioms, on the other hand, exclude standard quantum theory and the
standard decoherence functional: they are possible postulates which might be imposed
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on non-standard generalised decoherence functionals in non-standard generalisations of
quantum theory.
Isham and Linden give a minimal set of postulated properties for generalised decoher-
ence functionals:
d(0, α) = 0 for all α ∈ UP ;
d(α, β) = d(β, α)∗ for all α, β ∈ UP ;
d(α, α) ≥ 0 for all α ∈ UP ;
if α ⊥β then, for all γ , d(α⊕ β, γ) = d(α, γ) + d(β, γ) ;
d(1, 1) = 1 .
(9.1)
They then consider imposing new postulates on decoherence functionals. The first of
these — their posited inequality 1 — is that:
for all d ∈ D and for all α, β with α ≤ β we have d(α, α) ≤ d(β, β) . (9.2)
As Isham and Linden go on to point out, there are familiar examples in standard
quantum theory in which (9.2) is violated for a pair of histories α ≤ β in which one of the
histories (in their case α) is inconsistent.10
Two further postulates on generalised decoherence functionals are also posited:
α ⊥ β implies d(α, α) + d(β, β) ≤ 1 for all d ∈ D ; (9.3)
and
for all d ∈ D and all γ ∈ UP we have d(γ, γ) ≤ 1 . (9.4)
Isham and Linden give examples to show that, in standard quantum theory, with the
standard decoherence functional, inconsistent histories do not necessarily respect these
inequalities either.
Again, the difference from the examples considered in the present paper is worth em-
phasizing. All of the examples Isham and Linden consider involve inconsistent histories —
these are all they require in order to investigate possible properties of decoherence func-
tionals applied to arbitrary, not necessarily consistent, quantum histories. These examples
are not problematic for the consistent histories approach to quantum theory, according to
which the inconsistent histories have no physical significance, and they do not give rise to
10 The suggestion that inequality 1 is true when applied to sequences of projectors onto subsets
of configuration space in a path-integral quantum theory is thus misleading: it is easy to find
configuration space analogues of these examples. I am grateful to Chris Isham and Noah Linden
for discussions of this point.
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new interpretational questions in any conventional quantum histories approach, for essen-
tially the same reason. The discussion in the present paper, on the other hand, looks at
the properties of consistent histories in standard quantum theory: we have argued that
their failure to respect ordering relations is problematic and explained that it does raise
new questions.
Suppose now that we set aside Isham and Linden’s motivations, and alter their order-
ing postulates so that they apply, not to generalised decoherence functionals applied to all
quantum histories in an abstract generalisation of quantum theory, but to the standard
decoherence functional applied to ordered consistent histories in standard quantum theory.
We then obtain the following:
for all α, β with α ≤ β we have d(α, α) ≤ d(β, β) ; (9.5)
α ⊥ β implies d(α, α) + d(β, β) ≤ 1 ; (9.6)
and
for all γ we have d(γ, γ) ≤ 1 . (9.7)
Here d is the standard decoherence functional, α, β and γ are now taken to be ordered
consistent histories, and α ⊥ β means that α and β are disjoint — i.e., there is at least
one time at which their respective events are represented by contrary projections.
The first of these equations holds by the definition of an ordered consistent history,
but it might perhaps be hoped that the others could restrict the class of histories further.
However, the second equation also holds for all ordered consistent histories. To see this,
note that α ⊥ β implies that β ≤ (1−α), and that if α is a consistent history then (1−α)
is too. The fact that β is ordered consistent thus implies that
p(β) ≤ p(1− α) = 1− p(α) . (9.8)
The third equation, moreover, holds for all consistent histories, ordered or otherwise. It
seems, then, that ordered consistency may be the strongest natural criterion that can be
defined using the basic ingredients of consistency and ordering.
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